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There is a very famous photograph, taken sometime in the late 1950s, of Nelson
Mandela in the costume of a member of the Thembu aristocracy. Draped in a
toga-like cloth which leaves much of his ehest exposed - the photo is essentiaüy
a bust - hè is wearing various arm rings and a necklace made of Shells. It was
widely distributed with the apparent approval of the ANC. Clearly it was saying
two things. First it was announcing the fact that Mandela was a man whose
background gave him the right to rule. He is, after all, a member of the
Thembu royal family, as high an aristocrat as it is possible to be in South Africa
without being a monarch. Thus by inheritance and by training during his youth
hè comes from the governing circles of the societies in the Transkei where hè
was brought up. Secondly, though, the photo probably was meant to make clear
to those of conservative disposition that Mandela, and by extension the ANC,
had not lost contact with their values, and that he was thus a man of both
worlds, the old and the new.1
Such a photo would not be taken today, even though the messages are still
apposite. The problem is that very much the same symbols are being used by
Chief Mangosutho Buthelezi, of the Inkatha Freedom party and KwaZulu, the
ANC's most dangerous African opponent. As aristocratie as Mandela, Buthelezi
has been frequently seen and photographed in the leopard skins of the Zulu
chiefs. His appeal is no longer to all South Africans but rather only to those
who claim to be Zulu. While Mandela used the symbols of chieftainship as
something universal within black South Africa, for Buthelezi those same
symbols are becoming part of his ethnic message.2 They are thus divisive, not
inclusive.
This contrast is symbolic far beyond South Africa alone. Indeed it epitomi-
ses the problems which many African states have had confront in the past thirty
years or so. One basic problem that they all faced at independence was the very
fact that they had been dependent. They were new states. Their extents were
the result of the colonial partition of the continent at the end of the last
Century, and often bore relatively little relationship to power relations or
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cultural divisions which had preceded the European conquest. Thus they had no
history as coherent units, except for that which they may have developed during
the nationalist struggle against the British, the French, the Portuguese or the
Belgians. These struggles moreover had often been perfunctory, or in themsel-
ves divisive. In any case once the struggles had achieved their aim, the unity
which they sometimes created needed other sources if it was to be maintained.
As always one of the most potent sources of symbolic unity was to be
history. The states of modern Africa were to be the nations of the future. They
were of course orientated towards the future. The state would become a nation
by constructing a prosperous, just and developed society, in which all its citizens
would share under the benevolent guidance of whoever happened to be its
leader. As was so often stressed in the 1960s and 1970s, both by African
politicians and by European and American academies, the nations of Africa
were being built. But while a nation must perhaps take its legitimation outside
the present, at least in part, that legitimation cannot only be in what is to come.
That would require a collective act of faith beyond the reasonable. Such
euphoric suspension of reason might be possible for a few months, even a few
years, but would never survive the disappointments which even the most
unrealistic of politicians knew would follow independence. The ties to bind the
inhabitants of Africa's new states to each other - and, the cynic would say, to
bind them in thraldom to their new leaders - had to be those of the past. As
Ernest Renan wrote a Century ago,
La nation ... est i'aboutissant d'un long passé d'effors, de sacrifinces et de dévouements.
Le culte des ancêtres est de tous Ie plus legitimes; les ancêtres nous ont faits ce que nous
sommes. Un passé héroïque, des grands hommes, de la gloire (j'entends de la véritable),
voile Ie capital social sur lequel on assied unc idee nationale.
Renan wrote more. Nations not only need a history. They also need to get it
wrong. "Lfoubli, et je diraie même Terreur historique, sont un facteur essential
de la création d'une nation, et c'est ainsi que Ie progrès des études historiques
est souvent pour la nationalité un danger."4 In the rest of this paper, I will
examine a few of the creatively wrong ways in which the leaders of independent
Africa have presented the history of the continent.
One word of caution is nevertheless in order. Living as hè did at the end of
the nineteenth Century, Renan would have believed that it was possible to have
a history that was nol wrong. We now know otherwise, although we at least
ought to know - pace vulgär postmodernism - that some histories are less wrong
than others. In this, of course, there is a necessary tension between the acade-
mie historian and the politician. Professional historians, whether in Europe or in
Africa, see part of their role as debunking myths, as showing how that which
3 Ernest Renan, 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?', Oeuvres complètes (Ie Er/test Renan (Paris n.d.)
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was taken for granted was simply not true. In the process, they may end up
making new myths, usually, and not coincidentally, consistent with their own
political position. That, as they say, is another story. It is not usually part of
their brief to make such myths, except when for reasons of self-preservation
they announce themselves as keepers of the nation's memory. Politicians, on the
other hand, are in the business of making myths. It is their part to construct the
narratives by which their countries may live. If they succeed, then for a time,
perhaps a generation, the myths they have made about the past and the present,
and indeed about the future, will turn out to be thought true, even if they are
known to be factually inaccurate.5 In the early days of independence in Africa
there were many myths to be made.
The contents of those myths varied greatly from country to country, of
course. Some of them were concerned to heal the wounds which the indepen-
dence process had caused. The classic example was the statement made by
Jomo Kenyatta, first president of Kenya, that "we all fought for freedom."6 This
was only the case by the widest possible definition of 'fought', as Kenyatta well
knew. There were many, both among Kenyatta's own closest colleagues and
among his opponents, who owed their pre-eminence to the fact that they had
not fought the British, but had collaborated with them against the Mau Mau
guerillas, or had taken up the space from which Mau Mau and those associated
with it had been cleared.
In general, though, there were two sorts of myths about the past which the
leaders of the new states of Africa attempted to forge. The first was the myth of
the glorieus past. Europeans had so often told Africans that they had no
history. Until the coming of the Europeans, it was said, Africa had known only
the "unrewarding gyrations of barbarous tribes", to use once again the famous
denigration made by the Regius Professor of History at Oxford, Hugh Trevor-
Roper, which hundreds of historians of Africa have used as a pispaaltje.7 When
there were unequivocal signs of an African past which could not be ignored,
such as the ruins of Great Zimbabwe, European colonists did all they could to
annex them, in this case by proclaiming that the ruins had been built by earlier
colonists, Phoenicians for instance, and that the ruin of the civilisation that had
built them had been caused by the intermingling of the colonists with degenera-
In any case, critics should remember Francis Crick's comment that any theory which
accounts for all the facts cannot bc correct, since some of the facts themselves are bound
to be wrong.
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te Africans.8 It was against this sort of denigration that both the first generati-
on of historians of Africa and the nationalist politicians had to contend.
Politicians were hungry if selective consumers of historians' discoveries
about the African past. They were of course not interested in the revelations
about the African role in the slave trade to the New World, nor in stories about
African collaboration with the colonisers. What they needed, and what they
found, were heroes and examples. The heroes would be the heroes of African
resistance to colonial conquest. The link from Samori Touré, who led the
attempts to keep the French out of much of West Africa, to his descendant
Sekou Touré, the first president of the Republic of Guinea, was repeatedly
stressed. Maji Maji, the revolt against the Germans in early colonial Tanganyi-
ka, was seen as a forerunner of TANU, the new nationalist party, although at
the same time people were careful to stress the differences, and to make clear
that adherence to TANU would not end in a massacre as Maji Maji had
done.9 Much the same sort of process went on in what was then Rhodesia,
where a close connection was made between the uprising against the British
South Africa Company in 1896-7 and that against the Smith regime after the
Unilateral Declaration of Independence. The two wars are still known as the
first and the second Chimurenga, respectively. There was perhaps a shadow side
to this particular episode, however. The same lessons were being drawn by the
colonial security forces. Terence Ranger's classic nationalist history of the first
Chimurenga, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896 - 7: A study in African Resis-
tance, could not be reprinted until after independence because it was being
used as a text-book in counter-insurgency by the Rhodesian Army.
The examples which the new states could stress were of course the old
states. Kwame Nkrumah is said to have based his dislike of anthropology on the
famous collection of essays edited by Meyer Portes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard
entitled African Political Systems.11 This book, once the staple of all those
who read about African politics, does not place its emphasis on the centralised
politics of pre-colonial Africa, but rather on the stateless societies, and indeed
in various of its contributions the statishness of even those states which are
discussed is played down. For Nkrumah, this was one more example of Europe-
ans denying the African past its glory. What was needed, then, was to stress that
Africans had indeed created powerful states in the past, that these had contribu-
8 Henrika Kuklick, 'Contested Monuments: the politics of Archeology in Southern Africa'
in: George W. Stocking (ed.), Colonial situations: essays on the contextualization of
ethnographic knowledge (Madison, London 1991); Peter Garlake 'Prehistory and ideology
in Zimbabwe' in: J.D.Y. Peel and Terence Ranger (eds.), Past and Present in Zimbabwe
(Manchester 1983).
9 Terence Ranger, 'Connections between "primary resistance" movements and modern
mass nationalism in East and Central Africa', Journal of African History 9 (1968).
10 (London 1967).
11 f London 1940Y
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ted to the wealth and status of their subjects, and thus that the new states of
post-colonial Africa would also do so.
This was to create problems. It was all very well to stress the glories of pre-
colonial states in the abstract. For a nationalist in the Gold Coast, the prime
example of a flourishing pre-colonial state was Asante, which in the nineteenth
Century had dominated an area which was more or less equivalent to that of the
British colony in the twentieth Century. The problem, for Nkrumah, was that his
main political adversaries were closely associated with Asante. The old kingdom
had not disappeared into historical limbo, to be resurrected as a symbol as and
when it was convenient. It was still a living political entity, with a specific ruling
elite and an economie structure all of its own. To have placed too much
emphasis on Asante in the myth construction for the new state would have had
two undesired consequences. First, it would have privileged those who happened
to be the opponents of the group of politicians who were achieving power in the
1950s. Secondly, it would have exacerbated sectional conflict within the country.
The answer which was found to this dilemma was to stress the country's
connections with an ancient Africa which preceded the rise of Asante and could
in no way cause problems for what was happening in the Gold Coast of the
time. The result was the renaming of the country as Ghana. This referred to
one of the ancient kingdoms of West Africa, which had flourished at the end of
the first millennium A.D. and was regularly reported in Arabic sources. It was
apparently not important for the new country that its name derived from a
kingdom which was situated some thousands of kilometres to the north-west,
with its capital probably in modern Mauritania, and which would not have had
control over a single square metre of the modern country. Ghana was both
glorious and neutral. A more suitable symbol can scarcely be imagined.
Analogous dilemmas faced many of the rulers of new African states, and
can often be seen, as was the case with Ghana, in the names which were chosen
for the new country. Thus the new rulers of Dahomey did not wish to have
their subjects reminded of the old kingdom of that name. They thus adopted
the designation of Bénin, which refers to the gulf of sea on which the country
lies, and ultimately to the state now best known for the magnificent bronze
sculpture which the British looted from it in 1897. That Benin city is several
hundred kilometres east of Bénin (country), and in fact now a fairly minor
place in Nigeria is really of no account. Dahomey had been a military monarchy
which had waged war on many other inhabitants of the present territory and
often had exported them as slaves. It was not a propitious symbol of the
country's unity.
Again, Congo was too Belgian a name to Mobuto to tolerate when hè came
to power in that vast country, and perhaps more importantly, it referred to
casily to the Bakongo, the people living between Kinshasa (as he also renamed
Leopoldville) and the coast. The Bakongo, too, formed the power base of one
of his opponents, Kasavubu. The Congo was thus to be renamed Zaire after
what was thought to be the original name of the great river (but was in fact a
Portugese designation.) Mobuto's countcrparts to the north of the river appa-
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rently had no such hang-ups, and maintained the colonial name of both river
and country - they also most unusually retained the name of the capital city,
Brazzaville, which glorifies the founder of the French colonialism in the region;
perhaps, any alternative would have been too divisive so that it was better to
leave well alone.
In essence, then, all these attempts to legitimate new African states on the
basis of a heroic or glorious past had to face similar problems. Whenever the
past was still alive, it did not vote for the nationality of the new state, but for
that of some other group, usually one denigrated as a tribe. To the extent to
which the nation and the tribe were in conflict for the adherence of the people,
and to which 'tribalism' was seen as an enemy - and many African countries did
fall apart along ethnic fault lines - then such could not be tolerated. Indeed, it
was often claimed that the new states' leaders were national, or indeed Pan-
African in orientation, and their opponents were mere tribalists. Other myths
would have to be found.
The most frequent choice was to fall back on the myth of merrie Africa.12
This is the claim that the values that a particular individual may wish to
propagate are those of African tradition, and as such inviolate. It might seem
that tradition could only be used as a justification of conservative policies, but
this is not the case. It was always possible to claim that the values in question
had been submerged during the colonial period, and that their restoration,
albeit in a new form, can provide for the guidance of Africa along the desired
lines. Thus, to give one example, Julius Nyerere defended the policies of
Ujamaa, as Tanzanian socialism was known, in these terms:
By the use of the word 'ujamaa' [...] we state that for us socialism involves building on
the foundation of our past, and building also to our own design, We are not importing a
foreign ideology into Tanzania and trying to smother out distinctive social patterns with
it. We have deliberately decided to grow, as a society, out of our own roots, but in a
particular direction and towards a particular kind of objective. We are doing this by
emphasizing certain characteristics of our traditional organization, and extending them so
that they can embrace the possibilities of modern technology and enable us to meet the
challenge of life in the twentieth Century world.13
Ujamaa, as hè explains, actually means 'family-hood'. Thus Nyerere was clai-
ming that the ideals of the African family and those of the socialist society
which hè wished to create were one. It was his hope - it turned out to be an
illusion - that in Tanzania socialism would be created on the basis of the family
values of rural African society. It was a clear use of a version of the African
past in order to justify a version of the present and the future.
There have been a whole variety of variations on this theme. Some have
been relatively benign. Africans, we have often been told, are "traditionally
12 So called by A.G. Hopkins, Au Economie History of West Africa (London 1973) 10.
13 Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism/Uhttm na Ujamaa: a selecüon for wrilings and
democratie" a'nd believe in talking everylhing through until they have, reached a
compromise acceptable to all.14 The scarcity of democratie governments, at
least according to Western Standards, would seem to prove the falsity of such a
concept, but of course it could always be argued (probably no longer) that
Western party structures can only give rise to confrontational politics, and that
within one-party regimes discussion to a compromise was possible in a way
which would be precluded by the clashes of open disputes.
Other uses of tradition have been less innocuous. The idea that African
tradition does not permit "two bulls in a single kraal" has far too often led to
the sanctioning of dictatorships and one-party government. More widely,
African tradition has been used to justify the sexism of most modern African
states. Robert Mugabe, the president of Zimbabwe, expressed the matter very
cleariy.
Custom and tradition have tended more to favour men than women, to promote men
and their status and demote women in status, to erect men as masters of the home,
village, clan and nation. [...] The general principle governing reiationships behveen men
and women has, in our traditional society, always been that of superiors and inferiors.
Our society has consistently stood on the principle of masculine dominance - the
principle that the man is the ruler and the woman nis dependant and subject.
From the context of this speech, at the opening of the First Zimbabwe Wo-
men's Seminar in 1979, it would seem as if Mugabe was here deploring traditi-
on and stressing his government's commitment to doing away with it and giving
women their rightful role in society and political life. This, though, has been a
rare reaction. The same arguments can be used, and often have been used, to
ridicule and denigrate those women who would challenge male exclusivity in the
public sphere.
In this context, a detailed criticism of the historical basis of these claims is
not in order. It is only necessary to state that Africa was always one of the main
loei for the argument that 'tradition', as we now see it, is not something which
has been there since time immemorial, but rather was 'invented' at sonie
particular moment in the usually recent past.16 In particular tribes, more
widely ethnicities, and Systems of customary law have been seen as colonial
creations.17 The inventors, of course, were those who came to profit by their
14 For an example, see Randolphe Vigne, 'Past Personal', South African Review of Books 5,
2 (1993).
15 Cited in Stephanie Urdang, 'Women 'in national liberation movements' in: Margaret Jean
Hay and Sharon Stichter (eds.), African Women South of the Sahara (London, New York
1984) 157.
16 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge
1983), especially Terence Ranger The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa'.
17 E.g. John I l i f f e , A Modern Histoiy of Tanzania (Cambridge 1979), especially the chapter
ent i t led The creation of trihes'; Ixroy Vail (ed.), The creation of Tribalism in Southern
Africa (London 1989); Mart in Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order: The colonial
cxperiencc in Malawi and Zambia (Cambridge 1985).
creations, notably elderly men, who would make clear to those codifying their
law that all power 'traditionally' was in the hands of elderly men.
For all that, the politics of tradition remain vitally intertwined with the
politics of modern states. The classic recent example concerns Kenya. For six
months in 1987, the country was convulsed by the question as where a leading
Sawyer, S.M. Otieno, should be buried, at the farm hè shared with his wife
outside Nairobi or at the place of his birth in Siaya in Western Kenya. In such
bald terms, the question seems trivial, but in fact the matter at issue was
whether a man could abdicate from the customs of his ethnic origin. Otieno had
been born a Luo, but was married to a Kikuyu. His widow and his patrilineal
clan both claimed him, and eventually the highest court in Kenya decided that
African customs had to be upheld, and that the body belonged to his natal
relatives. This. was applauded - and had perhaps been orchestrated - by the
President, Daniel Arap Moi. In part hè was here playing the Luo and the
Kikuyu off against each other, but at a deeper level hè and the Kenyan' courts
were announcing that Kenya is a nation of tribes, just as once there was an
'Europe des patries'. There could be no supratribal elite, and thus also no
multi-tribal coalition to bring down Arap Moi himself.18
It is possible to exaggerate. The next major debate in Kenya was apparently
about Daniel, Darius and the Lions' den. The ways in which this biblical
episode allowed slightly coded discussion of the position of a tyrannical presi-
dent should be clear. Nevertheless, whereas history was once seen as dangerous,
precisely because it would fan the flames of tribal animosity, now, in some
contexts at least, history and tradition - the two are after all inseparable - is
used to maintain ethnic divisions. Kenya is not alone in this acceptance of
ethnic divisions as constituting the essential building blocks of political life.
Nigeria, among many others, had increasingly become a nation of tribes. The
specific courses of politics over the last half-century have produced many
different constellations to attack or to justify. History never provides easy
predictions, in Africa as elsewhere. It can be used to provide the basis for a
very wide range of expectations about the future.
18 On the whole matter, see David William Cohen and E.S. Atieno Odhiambo, Burying SM:
the politics ofknowledge and the sociology of power in Africa (Portsmouth, London 1992).
19 John Lonsdale in: Cohen and Atieno Odhiambo, Burying SM, 110-111.
